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 Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk meneliti praktik pelaporan sukarela aktiva 
tak berwujud dalam laporan tahunan perusahaan telekomunikasi di Asia 
Tenggara dan Australia. Sample pada penelitian ini adalah 75 perusahaan 
telekomunikasi pada tahun 2007, 2008 dan 2009. Penelitian aktiva tak berwujud 
terdiri atas tiga kategori yaitu structural capital, relational capital, dan human 
capital, berdasarkan kategori dari Oliveira et al. 
 Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan metode content analysis pada annual 
report perusahaan sample dengan index penelitian yang dikembangkan oleh 
Oliveira et al. sebagai variabel terikat, dan dianalisis dengan regresi berganda. 
Variabel bebas, yaitu ukuran perusahaan, leverage, konsentrasi kepemilikan,  
marjin EBITDA, sistem hukum negara asal dan secrecy accounting value 
dianalisis sebagai faktor – faktor yang mempengaruhi praktik pelaporan sukarela 
aktiva tak berwujud. 
 Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa ukuran perusahaan dan secrecy 
accounting value berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap praktik pengungkapan 
sukarela aktiva tak berwujud. Sebaliknya, leverage, konsentrasi kepemilikan, 
marjin EBITDA dan sistem hukum negara asal tidak berpengaruh terhadap 
praktik pelaporan sukarela aktiva tak berwujud. 
 
Kata Kunci : Pelaporan sukarela aktiva tak berwujud, ukuran perusahaan, 
 leverage, konsentrasi kepemilikan, marjin EBITDA, sistem hukum 











 This study aims to examine intangible asset voluntary disclosure practices 
in annual report telecommunication company in South East Asia and Australia. 
This research sample is 75 telecommunication company at year 2007, 2008 dan 
2009. Intangible asset disclosure study consist of three categories; structural 
capital, relational capital and human capital, based on Oliveira et al. categories. 
 This study using content analysis method in annual report sample 
companies with index developed by Oliveira et al. as dependent variable. 
Independent variable which are firm size, leverage, ownership concentration, 
EBITDA margin, legal system of home country and secrecy accounting value, are 
analysed as factors influencing intangible asset voluntary disclosure practices. 
 A significant positive relationship was observed between intangible asset 
voluntary disclosure and firm size and secrecy accounting value. However, 
leverage, ownership concentration, EBITDA margin and legal system of home 
country did not influence intangible asset voluntary disclosure practices. 
 
Keywords : Intangible asset disclosure practices, firm size, leverage, ownership 
 concentration, EBITDA margin, legal system of home country, 
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 Nowadays, researchers and practitioners consider intangible assets to be 
key factors for company success and important levers for value creation 
(Montemari, 2010). The role of intangibles as value and growth creators is 
accepted among economist, investors and managers ( Lev and Daum, 2004). 
 According to Ashton (2005) in Rashid et al (2009) it happens as the 
changing structure of global economy, as following : 
The shift from industrial age to the information age is changing the structure 
of global economy, and highlighted the importance of intangibles or 
intellectual capital. There has been considerable agreement in academic and 
practical fields that intangible is central to the value creation process in 
knowledge economy. 
 
 Rashid et al., (2009) argue that intangibles would improve the 
informational relevance of financial statements to users in making economic 
decisions. However, traditional (accounting-based) information systems are not 
able to provide adequate information about corporate intangible assets and its 
economic impact (Lev and Daum, 2004), and there is lack of appropriate 
accounting framework for intangibles (Rashid et al., 2009). 
 Current financial statements in its present form only give a limited 
account of the real economic conditions of a company. It provides no information 
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about the growth and adaptation potential of a company, nor do they disclose how 
efficient the company is in utilizing its bundle of resources, assets and capabilities 
to generate future revenue and income (Lev and Daum, 2004). In financial 
reporting standards developed by standards-making bodies, such as the IAI 
(Indonesia Accounting Board) and the IASB (International Accounting Standart 
Board), the recognition of intangible asset is still not able to cover all intangible 
assets owned enterprise, intangible asset that can be recognized in the Financial 
Statement only intangible asset that qualifies for recognition. Not all intangible 
asset categories (such as innovation, human capital, customer loyalty, employee 
competences) can qualify for recognition in the Financial Statement. This makes 
the companies can not explore the disclosure of intangible asset to attract 
investors and banks, therefore intangible asset voluntary disclosure is needed, as 
expressed by Ricardis (2006) in Montemari (2010) as following :
 
Considering that many intangibles are not recognized in the financial 
statement, highly innovative companies where intangibles play a significant 
role have much greater difficulty attracting investors and banks. In these 
cases, voluntary disclosure of intangible assets can help reduce the 
uncertainties of investors and banks and, at the same time, it allows 
companies to have greater access to funds.  
 
 According to Andriessen (2004) in Montemari (2010), companies could 
have several reasons for disclosing information on its intangible assets. First, to 
improve information to stakeholders about the real value and future performance 
of the enterprise. Second, to reduce the information asymmetry between 
management, shareholders and investors. Third, to increase their ability to raise 
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capital, and to enhance their corporate reputation and affect the price of their 
stock. 
 This present study empirically explores intangible asset disclosure 
practices in firm’s Annual Report for a sample of South-East Asia and Australia 
Telecommunication Industry. This focus on one single industry follows the prior 
work (Gerpott et al, 2008) that identified the need for industry-focused research 
on the level of intangible asset disclosure. Specifically, there is evidence to 
suggest that the competitive prospect of firms operating on telecommunication 
services markets are strongly affected by intangibles (Gerpott et al, 2008). 
 This study conducted not only in Indonesia companies but also in another 
country in South-East Asia and Australia because one of the purpose of this study 
is to examine association between country difference and intangible asset 
disclosure. According to world bank data, countries in South East Asia are 
emerging countries. Consequently, this research also explore intangible asset 
disclosure practices in emerging countries, furthermore this research will compare 
intangible asset practices in South East Asia with Australia. Therefore, this study 
analyses factors influencing intangible asset disclosure in South-East Asia and 
Australia telecommunication industry. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 The literature suggests that there are various reasons for big companies 
disclose more information than smaller companies. First, the disclosure of detailed 
information for large companies is relatively cheaper (less costly) because they 
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are already providing such information for internal purposes. Second, the annual 
report is the main source of information for competitors, smaller companies tend 
not to reveal details about their activities for fear that would cause competitive 
disadvantage (Widowati 2009). Third, larger companies in general are exposed to 
a high level of public interest, they cope with this interest by reporting more 
extensively on their assets (Gerpott et al., 2008). 
 Corporations with high debt are generally under greater scrutiny by 
creditors to ensure that they are not violating debt covenants, and consequently, 
this scrutiny would result in corporations disclosing more comprehensive 
information on different corporate items especially those relating to debt 
covenants (Kang, 2006). According to Oliveira et al (2006) firms with high 
leverage levels tend to lead to high agency costs. Consequently, companies with 
high levels of leverage tend to disclose more information voluntarily, including 
information on intangible assets in order to reduce agency costs. 
 According to Gerpott et al (2008), higher EBITDA margins are indicative 
of higher levels of operational efficiency. Intangible assets such as highly skilled 
employees or sophisticated organizational processes contribute to achieving a 
high level of efficiency. 
 Regional cultural differences can shape intangible asset disclosure 
quality, at least for specific intangible asset categories. For instance, a less (more) 
individualistic cultural might encourage more extensive human (investor) capital 
reporting. Similarly, disclosure patterns may be affected by a country’s 
accounting culture, and legal system, which, in turn, either stems from a common 
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or code law context (Gerpott, 2008). According to Radebaugh and Gray (1997), 
corporate accounting and information disclosure practices are influenced by a 
variety of economic, social, and political factors. The enviromental influences are 
include the nature of legal system, and culture. Based on Mir et al (2009) 
intangibe asset information disclosure in annual report may depend upon the level 
of secrecy in a culture. 
 Raffournier (1995) in Widowati (2009) suggest that the agency plays an 
important role in the policy of disclosure made by the company, as the annual 
report can be used to reduce monitoring costs. The separation between ownership 
and control causes agency cost of the conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Singhvi and Desai (1971) in Widowati (2009) supports the evidence 
that there is positive among the large number of ownership on the level of 
disclosure. 
 In accordance with the above mentioned that the factors such as firm 
characteristic (size, leverage, ownership concentration), firm financial 
performance (ebitda margin) and country difference (legal system of home 
country and secrecy versus transparency) are expected influencing the practice of 
intangible assets voluntary disclosures in companies in the telecommunications 
industry in South-east Asia and Australia.  
 Therefore, the research question of this research is what the factors 
influencing the intangible asset disclosure are. 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
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  According to the problem, the purpose of this study are as follows : 
1. To analyse the influence of firm size on intangible aset disclosure 
practice of companies in South-east Asia and Australia 
Telecommunication Industry. 
2. To analyse the influence of leverage on intangible aset disclosure 
practice of companies in South-east Asia and Australia 
Telecommunication Industry. 
3. To analyse the influence of ownership concentration on intangible aset 
disclosure practice of companies in South-east Asia and Australia 
Telecommunication Industry. 
4. To analyse the influence of EBITDA margin on intangible aset disclosure 
practice of companies in South-east Asia and Australia 
Telecommunication Industry. 
5. To analyse the influence of legal system of home country on intangible 
aset disclosure practice of companies in South-east Asia and Australia 
Telecommunication Industry. 
6. To analyse the influence of secrecy versus tranparency accounting value 
on intangible aset disclosure practice of companies in South-east Asia 
and Australia Telecommunication Industry. 
 
1.4 Contribution of the Research  
  The contribution of the study are as follows : 
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1. It responds to the call for further survey research that focuses on the cross 
cultural single industry of intangible asset voluntary disclosure. 
2. To give contribution to accountings development, especially about 
intangible asset disclosure in the telecommunication industry in South-
east Asia and Australia. 
1.5 Research Outline 
 Chapter I explain about the main issue of this study that consist of 
research background, research question, researh objectives and purposes, and 
research outline. Then Chapter II explain literature review. Based on literature 
review, researcher will establish conceptual framework, and then formulate the 
research hypothesises. Chapter III explain research design, population, sample and 
sampling, research variable and variable operational definition, data collect 
procedur, and analysis method. Chapter IV explain description of research object, 
quantitative analysis, result interpretation, and argumentation of research results. 














2.1 Grand Theory 
 This study explores factors influencing intangible asset disclosure. 
Factors examined in this study include : firm size, leverage, ownership 
concentration, EBITDA margin, legal system of country, and secrecy accounting 
value. 
 Theories taken to explain factors that will be examined in this study are 
agency theory, signalling theory and stakeholder theory. 
2.1.1 Agency Theory 
 Agency relationship according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) is a 
contract under principal and agent. The principal engage the agent to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent. In the company, shareholders as principal enter a contract 
to maximize her welfare by increasing profitability. Manager as the agent is 
motivated to maximize the economic and psychological needs, such as obtaining 
investment, loans, and compensation contracts. These relationships lead to agency 
costs caused by conflict of interest between principal and agent.  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that agency costs generated by the 
managers. Therefore, they are motivated to provide information voluntarily in 
order to reduce these agency costs.  
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 Agency costs increase with increase of external capital which is likely to 
be higher in larger companies, in consequence, agency theory can explain the 
positive relationship between firm size and levels of disclosure (Widowati, 2009). 
 Agency theory is taken to explain relationship between ownership 
concentration and level of disclosure. Agency theory suggests that where there is 
a separation of ownership and control of a firm, the potential for agency costs 
arises due to conflicts of interest between the two contracting parties. 
Subsequently, the potential for conflicts between principal and agent is greater for 
companies whose share ownership is widely-held than in more closely-held 
companies. 
 Agency theory in the other hand, is taken to explain relationship between 
leverage and level of disclosure. Based on agency theory, a corporation with high 
leverage has an incentive to disclose more information. Since creditors can price 
protect themselves via restrictive debt covenants, managers have incentives to 
increase disclosures to reduce agency costs (Kang, 2006).  
2.1.2 Signalling Theory 
 Signalling theory assumes that firms with superior performance (or good 
companies) use financial information to send signals to the market (Spence,1973). 
The basic assumption of the signaling theory is information asymmetry problems 
that occur in the market. This theory shows how asymmetric information can be 
reduced by a party who has more information by sending a signal to other parties. 
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Signalling is a common symptom that can be applied to each market with 
asymmetric information (Widowati, 2009). 
 Various studies have shown that companies with an unfavorable financial 
information such as high leverage will give a signal to the market in the form of 
voluntary disclosure of information, including information about its intangible 
asset (Gerpott et al., 2008). Contrary, Oliveira et al. (2006) suggest that firms with 
a lower leverage might this signal via a favorable financial structure higher 
intangible asset disclosure quality. 
2.1.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 Definition of stakeholder according to Freeman (1983) is “groups and 
individuals who benefit from or are harmed by, and whose  rights are violated or 
respected by, corporate actions”. Stakeholder theory states that entire stakeholders 
have a right to be given information about the company's activities that affect 
them. 
 Stakeholders considered the party that affects or is affected by the 
company. The main role of company management is to assess the importance of 
meeting the demand of stakeholders in order to achieve corporate strategic 
objectives. When the degree of stakeholder power increases, the importance of 
meeting stakeholder demands increase in the same way, some of these request 
forms may be related to the provision of information on company activities 
(Ivada,2009). 
 Stakeholder Theory on the other hand, supports the notion that low 
concentration of ownership indicates the existence of a more diverse group of 
25 
 
stakeholders of the company, and subsequently, the company has more incentives 
to disclose information to respond to different perspectives of different 
stakeholders (Kang, 2006). 
2.1.4 Intangible Asset 
 In Indonesia, in line with International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38, 
Intangible Asset, the definition of intangible asset under Indonesia Accounting 
Standard Statement (PSAK) 19 on Intangible Assets paragraph 08 is as follows: 
Intangible assets are non-monetary assets that can be identified and has no 
physical form and held for use in produce or deliver goods or services, 
leased to other parties, or for administrative purposes (IAI, 2000). 
 
 An element called intangible assets when the definition of intangible 
assets as specified by paragraph 10 of SFAS 19 "identified, the control of 
resources and the future economic benefits" (IAI, 2000) is met. 
 PSAK 19 paragraph 85 explains that a group of intangible assets is a set 
of assets that it characteristic and use in similar operations. Examples of 
intangible assets are: (a) brand name, (b) computer software, (c) licensing and 
franchising; (d) copyright, patent and other intellectual property rights, (e) recipes, 
formulas, models, design, and prototype, and (f) intangible asset under 
development. 
 The Work Group “Accounting and Reporting of Intangible Assets” of the 
Deutsche Schmalenbach Gesellschaft fu¨r Betriebswirtschaft eV (DSG) in Gerpott 
et al (2008) developed intangible asset to seven general intangible classes. 
According to Gerpott et al (2008) taking into account the peculiarities of the 
26 
 
telecommunications sector, which was chosen as the study’s focal industry, the 
seven intangible categories can be profiled as follows: 
1) Human capital. This category highlights the employee-based value 
drivers of a firm. It reflects the inherent knowledge and skills of the 
employees, but also entails a firm’s culture and working climate. 
Operational human capital indicators include company and job tenure 
structures of a firm’s employees, employee turnover rates, and job 
satisfaction levels. Frequently, special knowledge and skills required to 
design and operate complex networks are found to be important 
intangible assets to telecommunications firms. 
2) Customer capital. Customer capital consists of market-related variables 
such as a firm’s current customer base, market share, customer 
satisfaction or brand strength. For TNOs, long-term relationships to 
contractually or emotionally bonded customers or both are among their 
key intangibles. 
3) Supplier capital. This category relates to the procurement processes and 
outcomes of a company. Supplier capital indicators include statements on 
radio license allocations or key suppliers. Radio spectrum licenses are 
particularly important intangible assets for mobile network operators 
(MNOs) since their number is very limited due to technical constraints. 
MNOs frequently tend to overpay in order to obtain radio spectrum 
licenses if they are allocated via auctions. 
4) Process capital. This intangible asset category focuses on the level of 
sophistication of a firm’s internal work sequences such as its quality 
management. Pertinent indicators include information on a firm’s sales 
network, planning and maintenance, or complaint management 
processes. 
5) Innovation capital. Innovation capital deals with a company’s R&D 
capitalization as reflected in a firm’s number and quality of patents or 
other intellectual property rights. Further, absolute and relative R&D 
expenditures, patent portfolio structure variables, or the ratio of sales 
generated with new products introduced within the last x years to total 
sales are common innovation capital proxies. 
6) Location capital. This category deals with advantages associated with the 
spatial location of the company. It includes valuable transport routes or a 
low geographical distance to universities with excellent graduates. For 
TNOs, location advantages often arise from the possibility of exclusively 
offering telecommunications services in economically highly attractive 
places (e.g.airports, shopping centers). 
7) Investor capital. This category deals with assets improving a firm’s 
position on international equity and/or debt markets. Investor capital 
information examples include a company’s (credit) rating, shareholder 
structure (e.g. positions of private and institutional investors), systematic 
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risk, or the mere number of investor relations roadshows/analyst 
meetings during a reporting period. 
 There are three categories of framework of intangible asset that is often 
used by several researchers. The three categories include structural capital, 
relational capital, and human capital. The three categories have been used in 
Oliveira et al. (2006); Bozzolan et al. (2003), and Widowati (2009) research. 
 Each component in the category of intangible assets described in more 
detail as follows (Widowati, 2009): 
1. Structural capital : is components that reflects the company's ability that 
derived from the system, process, structural, culture, strategy, policy, 
and the ability to innovate. Components in the category of structural 
capital are management philosophy, corporate culture, management 
processes, information system, network system, R&D activities, patens, 
copyright, dan trademark. 
2.  Relational Capital : is component that reflects the company’s ability 
that derived from relationship with extern parties. Component of 
relational capital are : brands and perception of thr firm’s product and 
service, customers, customers lyalty, portfolio order, company image, 
distribution chanels and structure, business collaboration contract, 
agreement and favorable contracts, suppliers, competitors, investors, 
community involvement, environmental activities, dan financial 
entities. 
3.  Human capital : human capital shows employee competency in success 
the companies. Human capital include employee, know how and 
experince, education, training, incentive and remunation, initiative, 
motivation, and dedication, teamwork capacitty and spirit, flexibility, 
productivity, occupational health and safety. 
 
2.1.5 Intangible Asset Disclosure Factors 
 This study examines factors influencing intangible asset disclosure 
practices by the companies, which are explained below.  
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2.1.5.1 Firm Size 
 Agency theory is taken to explain the positive relationship between firm 
size and disclosure level. Jensen and Meckling (1976) in Widowati (2009) 
explains that the agency costs increases when the proportion of external capital 
increased, which is likely to be higher for large companies. The use of external 
capital is likely to increase for large companies. Therefore, agency theory predicts 
a positive influence between firm size and level of disclosure.  
2.1.5.2 Leverage 
 Agency theory explains association between leverage and intangible 
asset disclosure. According to Kang (2006), corporations with high debt are 
generally under greater scrutiny by creditors to ensure that they are not violating 
debt covenants, and consequently, this scrutiny would result in corporations 
disclosing more comprehensive information on different corporate items 
especially those relating to debt covenants. Consequently, companies with high 
levels of leverage is likely to disclose more information voluntary, including 
information on intangible assets in order to reduce agency costs.  
2.15.3 Ownership Concentration 
 Raffournier (1995) in Widowati (2009) suggest that the agency plays an 
important role in the policy of disclosure made by the company, because the 
annual report can be used to reduce monitoring costs. The separation between 
ownership and control causes agency cost of the conflict of interests between 
managers and stockholders. Singhvi and Desai (1971) in Widowati (2009) 
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supports the evidence that there is positive among the large number of ownership 
on the level of disclosure. 
2.1.5.4 EBITDA Margin 
 According to Gerpott et al (2008), higher EBITDA margins are indicative 
of higher levels of operational efficiency. Intangible assets such as highly skilled 
employees or sophisticated organizational processes contribute to achieving a 
high level of efficiency. 
2.1.5.5 Legal System of Home Country 
 According to Radebaugh and Gray (1997), corporate accounting and 
information disclosure practices are influenced by a variety of economic, social, 
and political factors. The enviromental influences are include the nature of legal 
system, and the nature of accounting regulation. 
 Regional cultural differences can shape intangible asset disclosure, at 
least for specific intangible asset categories. For instance, a less (more) 
individualistic cultural heritage might encourage more extensive human capital 
reporting. Similarly, disclosure patterns may be affected by a country’s 
accounting culture, which, in turn, either stems from a common or code law 
context (Gerpott et al., 2008). 
 The legal system is also important in determining the extent to which 
company law governs the regulation of accounting. In countries with a tradition of 
codified Roman law (or civil codes), accounting regulation tend to be detailed and 




2.1.5.6 Secrecy Accounting Value 
 Hofstede (1980) in Radebaugh and Gray (1997) grouping countries into 
culture areas, on the basis of their scores on the Hofstede’s four value dimensions, 
using cluster analysis and taking into account geographical and historical factors. 
Four value dimensions initially identified by hofstede are individualisme versus 
collectivism, large versus small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty 
avoidance, and masculinity versus feminity. Table 2.1 shows the countries within 
each of the identified culture areas and any identifiable subgrouos of countries 
within each group.  
 Gray (1988) theorised connections between Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
values and accounting values. Gray (1988) developed a model to explain the 
association between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and accounting sub-cultural 
values, and developed hypotheses on their association. Gray’s model made a 
notable contribution to explain the impact of Hofstede’s cultural values on the 
measurement and disclosure dimensions of accounting systems in different 
countries (Mir et al., 2009). Gray’s (1997) accounting values included 
professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity versus flexibility, 
conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus transparency. This study 
highlights the last accounting value by Gray (1997), which is secrecy versus 
transparency. Based on Mir et al. (2009), intangibe asset information disclosure in 
annual report may depend upon the level of secrecy in a culture. 
 According to Gray’s (1997) accounting values, “secrecy versus 
transparency” refers to a preference for confidentiality and the restriction of 
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disclosing information about a company only to those who are closely involved 
with its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and 





















































































Source : G. Hofstede, Culture Consequences (Beverly Hills : Sage, 1980), p.336   
 in Radebaugh and Gray (1997) 
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2.2 Prior Research 
  Research on voluntary disclosure of intangible asset has flourished 
recently. One of them is Kang (2006)’s research on top 200 emerging market 
companies which was obtained from Business Week, 14th July 2003 issue. Kang 
(2006)’s research objective is to examine factors associated with the voluntary 
disclosure practice on those companies. The result is the extent of IA disclosure is 
associated with leverage, adoption of IFRS/US GAAP, industry type, price-to-
book ratio, and country-specific factors such as economic policy and legal system. 
On the other hand, firm size and ownership concentration are not found to be 
significant. 
  Oliveira et al. (2006)’s research on 56 listed companies at 31 December 
2003 on the Portuguese Stock Exchange found that the voluntary reporting of 
intangibles is influenced significantly by size, ownership concentration, type of 
auditor, industry and listing status.  
  Widowati (2009) replicated Oliveira et al. (2006)’s research on 43 listed 
companies at 31 December 2005, 2006 and 2007 on Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Widowati (2009) found that firm size and industry type influence intangible asset 
reporting practices. In Contrast with Oliveira et al. (2006), ownership 
concentration, leverage, profitability, and auditor type did not influence intangible 
asset reporting. 
  Gerpott et al. (2008) in the other hand, conducted research on single 
industry to detect industry-spesific patterns of intangible asset disclosure in an 
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international sample of 29 telecommunications network operators (TNOs) at June 
2003. Gerpott et al. (2008) found that intangible asset disclosures were often 
limited to small pieces of qualitative information. Intangible asset disclosure 
varies significantly by the home region of the TNO, with European TNOs 
displaying higher quality levels than their American counterparts, and intangible 
asset disclosure measures were not significantly related to TNOs’ financial 
performance criteria. Summary of prior research is shown in table 2.2. 
  There are several differences of the current study between prior research. 
First, beside including firm spesific characteristic, the study explore firm financial 
performance and country difference using Gray (1988)’s theory as independent 
variable. Second, the study focuses on single industry cross country in South-East 
Asia and Australia coverage. Commonly, research on international disclosure of 
intangible asset or intellectual capital mostly conducted in Europe, or in single 
country cross industry. However, countries in South-East Asia region based on 
World Bank data is include in emerging countries, thus the study explores 
intangible asset disclosure in emerging countries, comparing with Australia on the 
other hand. The difference, at last, are proxies to measure independent variable, 
sample size and more up to date time period. Therefore, these study is expected to 






2.3 Hypothesis Development 
 Based on problem statement, the hypotheses in this study are explained 
below. 
2.3.1 Firm Size 
 Based on agency theory, larger firm size is more likely to have greater 
agency problem than smaller firm size. To reduce those agency problem, manager 
as agent discloses more information to shareholders as principal. According to 
Widowati (2009), Agency costs increase when external capital increased which is 
likely to be higher in larger companies, thus agency theory can explain the 
positive relationship between firm size and level of disclosure 
 Prior work that detected significantly positive relations between firm size 
and intangible asset disclosure are Gerpott et al (2008) in Europe region, and 
Widowati (2009) in Indonesia, with the exception of Kang (2006) who observed 
insignificant associations. 
 Based on agency theory above, the hypothesis developed to examine 
association between firm size and intangible asset disclosure is following:  
H1 : There is a positive association between firm size and intangible asset 
voluntary disclosure index. 
2.3.2 Leverage 
 According to Agency Theory, a corporation with high leverage has an 
incentive to disclose more information. Since creditors can price protect 
themselves via restrictive debt covenants, managers have incentives to increase 
disclosures to reduce agency costs (Kang, 2006).  
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 Signalling theory suggests that a firm with a relatively low leverage has 
incentive to send signals to the market about its financial structure – implying 
higher voluntary disclosures (Oliveira et al, 2006). 
 The empirical evidence of the effect of leverage on intangible asset 
disclosure is mixed. Gerpott et al (2008) find a significantly positive relationship, 
in the other hand Kang (2006) find a significantly negative relationship, and 
Widowati (2009) find no such significant association. 
-  Based on the rationale that a higher leverage and a resulting higher 
financial risk lead to increased monitoring interests of the capital market in a 
corporation, it can be expected that highly leveraged companies are motivated to 
disclose more intangible asset information as one means to reduce their cost of 
capital (Gerpott et al., 2008). The following hypothesis is thus developed: 
H2 : There is a positive association between leverage and intangible asset 
voluntary disclosure index. 
 
2.3.3 Ownership Concentration 
 Agency theory suggests that where there is a separation of ownership and 
control of a firm, the potential for agency costs arises due to conflicts of interest 
between the two contracting parties. Subsequently, the potential for conflicts 
between principal and agent is greater for companies whose share ownership is 




 In the same way, stakeholder theory supports the notion that low 
concentration of ownership indicates the existence of a more diverse group of 
stakeholders of the company, and subsequently, the company has more incentives 
to disclose information to respond to different perspectives of different 
stakeholders (Cormier et al, 2005 in Kang, 2006). 
 Singhvi and Desai (1971) in Widowati (2009) suggests a reason why the 
distribution of ownership had significant impact on the quality of disclosure in 
annual reports. First, firms with large number of shareholders is likely to be public 
concern, as to pressure from stockholders and analysts, then the disclosures be 
done better. Second, firms with a large number of shareholders may reveal greater 
information to minimize the tremendous pressure by regulatory agencies. Third, to 
meet the demand marketibilitas in securities of companies, the company with a 
large number of shareholders is likely to disclose more information. Last, with the 
increasing number of shareholders, managers are increasingly aware companies to 
disclose more information as a form of social responsibility.  
 Prior work that detected significantly positive relations between firm size 
and intangible asset disclosure is Oliveira et al (2006). In other hand, Kang (2006) 
and Widowati (2009) find it not significant. 
 The following hypothesis is thus developed: 
H3 : There is a negative association between ownership concentration and 




2.3.4 EBITDA Margin 
 Agency theory posits that disclosure works as a mechanism to control a 
manager’s performance, that managers are stimulated to disclose information 
voluntarily to maintain their positions and compensation arrangements. Consistent 
with signalling theory, highly profitable companies are expected to be more likely 
to disclose good news to avoid undervaluation of their shares (Oliveira et al, 
2006). 
 However, Gerpott et al (2008) and Widowati (2009) detected 
unsignificant association between EBITDA margin and profitability and 
intangible asset disclosure. 
 Higher EBITDA margins are indicative of higher levels of operational 
efficiency. Intangible assets such as highly skilled employees or sophisticated 
organizational processes contribute to achieving a high level of efficiency 
(Gerpott et al, 2008). These companies would want to inform their stakeholders of 
such potential by voluntarily disclosing intangible asset information in their 
annual reports. The following hypothesis is following: 
H4: There is a positive association between EBITDA margin and intangible asset 
voluntary disclosure index 
 
2.3.5 Legal System of Home Country 
 It has been argued that generally, common law countries have a greater 
dispersion of corporate ownership and they also offer better legal protection and 
therefore have lower risks associated with legal systems. There is, however, an 
38 
 
opposing view – companies originating from those countries with higher degree 
of risks may try to negate the perceived problems by engaging in voluntary 
disclosure practices (Kang, 2006).  
 Common law countries can be characterized by an accounting culture 
emphasizing public disclosure to compensate for missing close ties. In contrast, in 
countries with code law systems the accounting culture might favor a close 
adherence to a set of accounting standards implying a low intangible asset 
dislosure, since intangible reporting is still not subjected to accounting standards 
in most cases (Gerpott et al, 2008). 
 Prior works result, Jaggie and Low (2000) indicate that firms from 
common law countries are associated with higher financial disclosures compared 
to firms from code law countries. In contrast, Gerpott et al (2008) found that firm 
from code law based countries disclosed more intangible asset than firm 
originating from common law based countries. 
 Subsequently, for the purpose of the current study, it is hypothesised that: 
H5 : There is a association between legal system of home country and intangible 
asset voluntary disclosure index. 
2.3.6 Secrecy Accounting Value 
 Secrey related to the disclosure dimensions (Radebaugh and Gray, 1997). 
Perera (1989) in Mir et al (2009) argue that the degree of secrecy preferred in an 




 Intangible asset disclosure is expected to be lower in companies annual 
report when its country include in culture areas which have high secrecy based on 
Gray’s (1998) theory. Subsequently, for the purpose of the current study, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H6 : Companies in secrecy accounting value countries will disclose less 
information about its intangible asset than other countries. 
 
2.4  Conceptual Framework 
 Based on the development of the hypothesis above, the conceptual 
framework of this study is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 presents the 
disclosure of intangible assets as measured by the index is treated as the 
dependent variable, the variable of interest researchers. While the independent 
variables are divided into three group. First independent variables related to firm 
characteristic. Second, independent variable related to firm financial performance, 



































































 This research method explain the research design, population and research 
sample, research variables and operational definitions, data collection procedures, 
and data analysis method. 
3.1  Research Design 
 Population in this study are telecommunication companies in South East 
Asia and Australia. According to world bank data, countries in South East Asia 
are emerging countries. Consequently, this study also explore intangible asset 
disclosure practices in emerging countries, furthermore this study will compare 
intangible asset practices in South East Asia with Australia. This focus on one 
single industry follows the prior work (Gerpott et al, 2008) that identified the need 
for industry-focused study on the level of intangible asset disclosure. Specifically, 
there is evidence to suggest that the competitive prospect of firms operating on 
telecommunication services markets are strongly affected by intangible asset 
(Gerpott et al, 2008). 
 Sampling in this study take purposive sampling method, which is a type of 
random sample selection of information obtained by using certain considerations. 
 Requirement that used in this study is telecommunication companies 
which share Annual Report consistently via website in 2007 – 2009, whereas 
Annual Report publish globally through the internet. Annual reports are 
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downloaded from website due to not all population companies are listed on stock 
exchange. 
 Data used in this study is Annual Report. The study used Annual Reports 
because they represent the concerns and interests of corporations in a 
comprehensive and compact manner. Further, they are regularly produced and 
offer an opportunity for a comparative analysis of management attitudes and 
policies across reporting periods (Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005). 
3.2  Research Variables and Operational Definition 
3.2.1  Dependent Variable 
 Based on Widowati (2009),  The dependent variable in this study is 
voluntary disclosure index of intangible assets, which consist of 32 items. These 
measurements using a scoring index. Scoring index range is 0-2, score 1 if the 
item is reported in the qualitative form, score 2 for the items reported in 
quantitative form, while 0 if not reported. Giving a higher score on the form of 
quantitative disclosure because the form of quantitative disclosures have number 
for each type of disclosure. This categories use categories that have been 
established by Oliveira et al. (2006). The highest value if the companies disclose 
all categories of intangible asset at 64.  
 Assessment of the dependent variable in this study uses an index that is 
formulated as follows: 
 Intangible Asset Disclosure Index (IADI) = s ????? ?         (3.1) 




di  :  intangible asset voluntary disclosure. Where di = 1 for disclosure in 
qualitative form, di = 2 if disclose in quantitative form, and di = 0 if not 
disclosing. 
m  :  maximum value of the items disclosed (64) 
 
3.2.2  Independent Variables 
 The independent variables of this research are Firm size, Leverage, 
Ownership concentration, EBITDA margin, Legal system of home country, and 
Secrecy accounting value. 
3.2.2.1 Firm Size 
 Firm size is the most commonly examined organizational correlate of 
corporate intangible disclosure (Gerpott et al., 2008). Several studies using firm 
size as an independent variable because the size of the company revealed that the 
larger the company, the greater the firms will make a voluntary disclosure 
(Oliveira et al., 2006) in Widowati (2009).  
 There are alternative proxies to measure firm size. These include total 
assets (Bozzolan et al., 2003; Oliviera et al., 2006),  sales (Bozzolan et al., 2003), 
turnover (Gerpott et al., 2008), market capitalization (Widowati, 2009),  and 
number of employees (Gerpott et al., 2008). 
 The present study measured size by telecommunication companies natural 
log total revenue (Ln Total Revenue). Ln use in this measurement to avoid large 
value differences with the value of other independent variables. All currencies of 
company sample were converted to US Dollar using the exchange rate at the 
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balance sheet date. Information about the exchange rate was downloaded from 
world bank data website. 
3.2.2.2 Leverage 
 Firm leverage shows firm ability to cover its current liabilities (Oliveira et 
al., 2006). Leverage in this study is measured as debt to equity ratio. Total debt or 
total liabilities, and total equity are taken from balance sheet of sample companies 
in years 2007, 2008, 2009. Leverage is measured as follows : 
Debt to Equity Ratio = Total Debt          (3.2) 
      Equity 
  
3.2.2.3 Ownership concentration 
 Ownership is the number of shares of companies that spread and owned by 
several shareholders (Oliveira et al., 2006). Kang (2006) said that data for 
ownership concentration was not easy to find. The best information available 
regarding ownership concentration was the shareholding percentage of each 
company by the top shareholder. Subsequently, ownership concentration was 
defined as the percentage of ordinary shares held by others than the top 
shareholder, and it was calculated from the available information on top 
shareholdings. 
 In this study, ownership is measured by ownership percentage of shares 
owned by 3 highest shareholders (Oliveira et al., 2006). Data of ownership 
concentration could be seen in annual report in years 2007, 2008, and 2009 under 




3.2.2.4 EBITDA Margin 
 EBITDA margin is computed by dividing a firm’s earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) by total revenue. The variable 
expresses the degree to which the revenue net of operating expenses covers the 
cost of assets and the financial claims of various debt and equity owners (Gerpott 
et al., 2008). EBITDA margin could be seen on annual report under ‘financial 
highlight’ provided by management of companies, or compute ratio earning 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total revenue. Those data 
could be seen on income statement sample companies in years ended 2007, 2008 
and 2009.  
 
3.2.2.5 Legal System of Home Country 
 According to Gerpott et al (2008), in common law systems accounting 
rules have been developed largely in the private sector. They are based on the 
assumption that corporate stakeholders interact with a firm mainly through arm’s-
length market transactions without corporate value insights stemming from close 
ties. Therefore, common law countries can be characterized by an accounting 
culture emphasizing public disclosure to compensate for missing close ties. In 
contrast, in countries with code law systems the accounting culture might favor a 
close adherence to a set of accounting standards implying a low IDQ, since 
intangible reporting is still not subjected to accounting standards in most cases. It 
is said by Hope (2003) in Gerpott et al (2008) that “it is not obvious whether legal 
systems dominate national culture or whether they are complements”.  
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 The type of legal system was measured as a binary dummy variable with 
common law countries coded as 1 and other as 0. 
 
3.2.2.6 Secrecy Accounting Value 
 Gray (1988) in Radebaugh and Gray (1997) combined Gray’s (1988) 
accounting values and the classification of Hofstede (1980)’s culture areas. Based 
on Gray’s (1998) accounting value and international classification as shown in 
figure 3.1, the type of secrecy accounting value was measured as a binary dummy 
variable with secrecy culture areas coded as 1 and other as 0. 
Figure 3.1 











Source : S.J Gray “Toward a Theory of Cultural Influence on The Development of 
 Accounting System Internationally” Abacus (March 1998).pp.13 in 




















3.3 Data Collecting Method 
 Data used in this study is secondary data, which is annual report of 
telecommunication companies in South East Asia and Australia, in years 2007 – 
2009. 
 The information of telecommunication company spread in South East Asia 
and Australia was searched in stock exchange of each country (such as 
www.asx.co.au, www.idx.com, www.klse.com.my, www.pse.com.ph, 
www.sgx.com), or through the search engine (such as www.google.com), and the 
websites that  provide information about telecommunication company and its 
website link in various country, such as www.ostamyy.com or 
www.alloexpat.com. Then, the annual report is downloaded from 
telecommunication company website. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis Method 
 Method of data analysis in this study is descriptive statistics analysis, 
classical asumptions test, and multiple linier regression analysis. 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics analysis is conducted to determine intangible asset 
disclosure index, firm size, leverage, ownership concentration, EBITDA margin, 
legal system of home country, and secrecy accounting value of 
telecommunication company in South East Asia and Australia. The measurement 




3.4.2 Classical Asumption Test 
 According to Kiswara (2010), a multiple regression model have to meet 
the classic assumptions in order to become a good estimation equation models, 
which are (1) Normal distribution of data known through normality testing, (2) 
Non Multicollinearity known through Multicollinearity testing, (3) Non 
heteroscedasticity, and (4) Non autocorrelation.  
3.4.2.1 Normality Testing 
 Normality testing used to test whether the data of dependent variable, 
independent, or both have normal distribution (Kiswara, 2010). According to 
Ghozali (2007), the purpose of normality testing is to test whether in the 
regression model,  confounding variables or residual variable have normal 
distribution. One ways to detect whether residual have normal distribution or not 
is statistical test.  
  Simple statistical testing conduct by looking at the value of kurtosis and 
skewness of the residuals. The value of z statistics for skewness is calculated 
using the formula below: ?•?? •??? ? ???? ????? ???                 (3.3) 
 While the value of z kurtosis can be calculated using the formula: •???????? ????????? ????              (3.4) 
 Note: 
 N = number of samples 
 If the value Z count > Z table, then the distribution is not normal. 
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3.4.2.2 Multicollinearity Testing 
  The purpose of multicollinearity testing is to test whether in regression 
model there is a correlation between independent variable (Ghozali, 2007). 
According to Kiswara (2010), that correlation can be detected based on tolerance 
value and VIF (Variance Inflation Factor), if tolerance approach 1 value and VIF  
are in the surrounding, then it is non multikol. 
 
3.4.2.3 Heteroscedasticity Testing 
  The purpose of the heteroscedasticity testing is to test whether there is 
residuals inequality in the regression model at one observation to another 
observation. If the residual variance from one observation to the other observation 
remain, it is called Homoscedasticity and if different, it is called 
Heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is detected by using the Park test. 
According to Ghozali (2007), Park argued method that variance (s2) is a function 
of independent variables expressed in equation as follows: 
 s 2i = aXiß             (3.5) 
 These equations are translated linear in equation logarithmic form so that it 
becomes: 
 Lns 2i = a + ßLnXi + vi            (3.6) 
 Because s2i is not known, it can be estimated by using Ut residuals as a proxy, so 
the equation becomes: 




3.4.2.4 Autocorrelation Testing 
  The purpose of autocorrelation testing is to test whether in linier 
regression model there is correlation between confounding error in t period and 
confounding error in t-1 period (before). If there is a correlation, it is called that 
there is a autocorrelation problem. Autocorrelation arises due to successive 
observations over time related to each other. This problem arises due to the 
residuals (confounding errors) are not independen from one observation to another 
observation. It is often found in time series data due to "interference" in the same 
individual / group in the next period. 
.  According to Gujarati (2003) in Widowati (2009) regression that affected 
autocorrelation problem, one of the corrective action is using data transformation. 
If the d value  of Durbin_Watson, the technique can be used is Theil – Nagar 
technique. Here are the steps to improve the autocorrelation : 
? Value of p (one estimation): 
 
         p^= N2 (1-d^/2) + k2                               (3.8) 
                      N2 – k2 
? Transformation for the first data: 
         Y = ??? ? ?????           and               (3.9) 
  X = ??? ? ?????         (3.10) 
? Transformation for the second data and the next data 
         Y = Y – (p^LagY)            and             (3.11) 
  X = X – (p^ LagX)         (3.12) 
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? If intercept element is conducted in all steps above, in fact it is an estimation 
 of ß0(1-p^) 
 
3.4.3 Multiple Liner Regression Model 
 The purpose of multiple linier regression analysis is to explore association 
between several independent variables and dependent variable. The regression 
equation in this study is following :  
 IADI = a + ß1FS + ß2Lev + ß3OOC + ß4EBITDA + ß5LOC + ß6SAV+ ?    (3.13) 
 Note : 
  IADI : Intangible Asset Disclosure Index 
  FS : Firm Size 
  Lev : Leverage 
  OC : Ownership Concentration 
  EBITDA : EBITDA margin 
  LOC : Legal System of Home Country 
  SAV : Secrecy Accounting Value    
  a : Constanta 
  ß : Regression coefficient 
  ?  : Error 
  
3.4.4 Stastistical Test 
  This model determine the best level of accuracy in regression analysis, in 
this case is shown by the Adjusted R2. Adjusted R2 value is used to determine the 
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percentage of independent variables influence to the dependent variable. It will be 
known how much the dependent variable will be able to be explained by the 
independent variable, while the rest is explained by the other reasons outside the 
model. 
a) Simultaneous Significance Testing (F Statistical Test) 
  To determine whether the independent variables collectively have the 
same effect on the dependent variable, therefore simultaneous test by using the F 
test should be done, with the following procedures: 
  H0 : bi = b2 = 0,   meaning, collectively, there is influence between the 
     independent variable on the dependent variable. 
  H0 : bi ?  b2 ?  0,   meaning, collectively, there is no influence of  
    independent variables on the dependent variable. 
  With a 5% significance level and df = nk, F-table values obtained. Then F-
table value compared with the F-count value that obtained. By comparing these two 
values, its effect will be able to determine, which is able to determine acceptance 
or rejection of the hypothesis, with the following criteria: 
?  When the F-count > F-table; Ha is received 
?  When the F-count  < F-table; Ha is rejected 
 
b) Individual Parameter Significance Tests (t Statistic Test) 
  The purpose of t Statistical Test is to see how far the influence of 
explanatory variables (independent) individually explaine the variation of 
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dependent variable. The desire Null hypothesis (H0) is whether a parameter (bi) is 
equal to zero, or : 
   H0: bi = 0, meaning no effect between the independent variable on  
    the dependent variable. 
   H0: bi ?  0, meaning that there is effect between the independent  
    variable on the dependent variable. 
  With a 5% significance level and df = nk, t-table values obtained. Then t-
table value compared with the t-count value that obtained. By comparing these two 
values, its effect will be able to determine, which is able to determine acceptance 
or rejection of the hypothesis, with the following criteria: 
?  When the t-count > t-table; Ha is received 
?  When the t-count  < F-table; Ha is rejected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
